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T
he equilibrium of a dynamic macroeconomic model can usually be
represented by a system of nonlinear difference equations, and in con-
temporary models these systems can be large and difﬁcult to solve.
Even for small models, it is common research practice to use approximations
that allow for analytical statements about the model’s behavior. The most
popular form of approximation is linearization around a steady state.1
To study linear approximations, economists have access to the methods
for solving dynamic linear models described in Sargent (1979) and Blanchard
and Kahn (1980). Blanchard and Kahn provide conditions under which there
exists a unique nonexplosive solution to a system of linear difference equa-
tions. In his analysis of ﬁrst- and second-order linear difference equations,
Sargent explains how, in some cases, models based on optimizing behavior
justify the exclusion of explosive solutions as equilibria. Subsequently, atten-
tion has shifted toward explicitly nonlinear optimization-based models, but
the methods described by Sargent and Blanchard and Kahn have been widely
used to study the linear approximations to nonlinear models.
For as long as linear approximations have been used, economists have
been aware of certain limitations. In particular, linear approximations may be
quantitatively inaccurate unless one restricts attention to the model’s behav-
ior near the point around which the linearization was taken. Recent work by
Benhabib,Schmitt-Groh´ e,andUribe(2001)hashighlightedanadditionallim-
itation of linearization that is potentially more severe: linearization may lead
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1A steady state is a point ¯ x such that if ¯ x is an equilibrium in any period t, then ¯ x is also
an equilibrium in period t + 1.
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one to incorrect conclusions about the existence or uniqueness of equilibrium.
These scholars have argued, based on this reasoning, that a monetary policy
rule widely advocated for its stabilization properties may actually subject the
economy to multiple equilibria. Our purpose in this article is to provide a
simple exposition of the type of problems highlighted by Benhabib, Schmitt-
Groh´ e, and Uribe. While we do not advocate that linearization be abandoned
entirely, it is important for users to be aware of the risks.
We use two simple models to illustrate the risks of linearization. In both
models,thedynamicsboildowntooneequationinonevariable. Thissimplic-
itymeansthatitisstraightforwardtocomparetheresultsbasedonlinearization
to the model’s global properties.
Intheﬁrstmodel,thesingleequationconcernstheevolutionofthestockof
governmentdebt. Wewillshowthatanalysisofthismodelbasedonlineariza-
tion can lead one to an erroneous conclusion about whether an equilibrium
exists. A researcher might conclude, for example, that a particular tax policy
rule leads to the nonexistence of equilibrium when, in fact, an equilibrium
does exist for all but extreme initial values of debt. Or, linearization could
suggest that an equilibrium always exists when actually there is none outside
a narrow range of initial levels of debt.
In the second model, the single equation concerns the evolution of the
inﬂation rate. There, an equilibrium always exists, but naive analysis based
on linearization can lead one to erroneously conclude that there is only one
equilibriumwheninfacttherearemany. Thus,aresearcherusinglinearization
might advocate a particular policy rule based on its promise of delivering a
unique equilibrium when in fact that rule is susceptible to multiple equilibria.
This precise critique has been made by Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe
against recent work advocating “active Taylor rules” for monetary policy.
In more complicated models, it may not be possible to determine whether
a linear approximation results in misleading conclusions about the unique-
ness and existence of equilibrium. However, in closing we will offer some
suggestions for minimizing the risk of being misled.
1. MACROECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
A typical macroeconomic model consists of a set of maximization problems
and a set of market clearing conditions pertaining to a vector of variables.
Solving a model involves two steps: The ﬁrst step is to derive the optimality
conditions that describe solutions to the maximization problems in isolation.
The second step is to collect these conditions with the market clearing condi-
tions and manipulate them so that the variables whose values are not known
at the beginning of a period (for example, the price of a unit of capital) are
expressed as functions of the variables whose values are known at the begin-
ning of a period (for example, the capital stock). We refer to the former setA. L. Wolman and E.A. Couper: Potential Consequences 3
of variables as nonpredetermined, and the latter set as predetermined. If at
least one such vector-valued function exists, then an equilibrium of the model
exists. If there is exactly one such function, equilibrium is unique, whereas
multiple functions correspond to multiple equilibria. The second step can
be difﬁcult, especially for models with many variables, and it often requires
some numerical approximations. The most popular approximation method is
linearization around a steady state.
We will describe two simple models, which will then be used in our anal-
ysis of linearization. In both models, there is assumed to be an inﬁnitely lived
representative consumer who receives a constant endowment of consumption
goods each period. The consumer discounts future utility at rate β per period.
In the ﬁrst model, there is a government that purchases a constant amount of
the consumption goods each period. The government issues debt and levies
lump- sum taxes in order to pay for its consumption. In the second model,
there is no government spending; however, the consumer derives utility from
real money balances as well as consumption. The government issues nominal
money by making lump-sum transfers to consumers.
A Model with One Dynamic Variable, Predetermined
The representative consumer has preferences for current and future consump-




subject to the budget constraint
ct + bt+1 + τt ≤ y + rt−1bt, (2)
where u () is an increasing and concave function; bt is the quantity of one-
period, real government debt maturing in period t, paying a gross interest
rate of rt−1; τt is the lump-sum tax levied in period t; and y is the constant
endowment received each period. Denoting by λt the Lagrange multiplier on
the budget constraint at time t, the ﬁrst order condition for consumption is
u (ct) = λt; (3)
the marginal value to the consumer of an additional unit of income is equal to
the marginal utility associated with using that income for consumption. The
ﬁrst order condition for bond holding is
λt = βrtλt+1; (4)
the marginal utility of income in the current period is equated to the present
discountedutilityofconvertingcurrentincomeintofutureincomeatthegiven
interest rate rt. The transversality condition is
lim
t−→∞
βtλtbt+1 = 0; (5)4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
this condition can be viewed as the ﬁrst order condition for bond purchases
in the “ﬁnal period.” It would be suboptimal for a consumer to accumulate
bonds so that the present utility value of consumption that could be realized
by selling those bonds in the distant future did not go to zero.
The government budget constraint is
bt+1 + τt ≥ g + rt−1bt, (6)
wheregistheconstantlevelofper-periodgovernmentpurchasesofgoods. The
left-hand side is the government’s sources of revenue, and the right-hand side
is the government’s uses of revenue. In equilibrium the goods market clears,
implying that government consumption plus private consumption equals the
total endowment of goods:
ct + g = y. (7)
Because the endowment and government consumption are constant, pri-
vate consumption must also be constant:
ct = c ≡ y − g ∀t. (8)
Since equilibrium consumption is constant, the marginal utility of consump-
tion is constant, and thus, from (3) and (4), the real interest rate is constant in
equilibrium:
rt = β−1. (9)
It remains to solve for the equilibrium quantity of government debt (bt+1)
and the tax rate (τt). The two equations left to determine these variables
are the government budget constraint (6) and the transversality condition (5).
One might think that the consumer’s budget constraint (2) is an additional
equation. However, if we substitute the market clearing condition (7) into
the consumer’s budget constraint, the consumer’s budget constraint and the
government budget constraint become identical:
bt+1 = (g − τt) + β−1bt. (10)
This result is an implication of Walras’s law (see Varian [1992, 317]).
It is clear that the government budget constraint and the transversality
condition are not sufﬁcient to determine a unique equilibrium path, or even a
ﬁnite number of equilibrium paths for bt+1 and τt. In order to narrow the set
of equilibria, the standard research practice is to specify a policy rule for the
quantity of debt issued or, more commonly, for the tax rate. Given a rule that
sets the tax rate as a function of other variables, one can determine whether
equilibrium exists and is unique.
Notethatiftherulemakesthetaxrateafunctionofnovariablesotherthan
bt+1 orbt, substitutingthetaxruleinto(10)yieldsoneequationthatimplicitly
determinesthecurrentperioddebtasafunctionofthepredetermineddebtfromA. L. Wolman and E.A. Couper: Potential Consequences 5
thepreviousperiod. Henceforth,wewillassumethatthetaxrulesetsthelump-
sum tax as a function of only the predetermined level of debt, τt = h(bt). In
this case, (10) explicitly describes the evolution of government debt:
bt+1 = g − h(bt) + β−1bt. (11)
Below we will assume a particular form for h(), and thus we will be able to
determine whether equilibrium exists and is unique.
A Model with One Dynamic Variable,
Nonpredetermined
The second model we will consider is one in which we again end up with a
single dynamic equation, although in this case the equation will not contain
a predetermined variable. Here the representative consumer has preferences
for current and future real money balances (mt) as well as consumption (ct),
given by the maximization problem
max
 
βt[u(ct) + v(mt)], (12)
where u() and v () are increasing, concave functions.2 In this model, the gov-
ernment issues non-interest-bearing money by making lump-sum transfers to

















In (13), ct and y are as deﬁned above. The new variables in (13) are the
nominal money supply (Mt = mtPt), the price level (Pt), the quantity of one-
period nominal bonds maturing in periods t +1 and t (Bt+1,B t), the nominal
interest rate on bonds maturing in the current period (Rt−1), and the quantity
of nominal transfers from the government to the household (TR t).4
Justasintheﬁrstmodel, theﬁrstorderconditionforconsumptionisgiven
by(3), withλt nowtheLagrangemultiplieronthebudgetconstraint(13). The
ﬁrst order condition for real money balances is
v (mt) − λt + β
Pt
Pt+1
λt+1 = 0. (14)
If the consumer increases real balances marginally in period t,he or she gains
current utility directly (v (mt)>0) but sacriﬁces current period consumption
2 We also assume limm→0 v  (m) <u   (y) and v  ( ˘ m) = 0, where ˘ m<∞. The former condi-
tion implies that, at a sufﬁciently high (ﬁnite) nominal interest rate, the economy will demonetize.
The latter condition implies that, at a nominal interest rate of zero, individuals become satiated
with a ﬁnite level of real balances.
3 See Brock (1975) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) for further discussion of related models.
4Although we have included nominal bonds in the consumer’s budget constraint, their quantity
will be zero in equilibrium (we assume that the government does not issue or purchase bonds,
and since households are identical, the quantity of bonds must be zero).6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
valued at λt. The same nominal balances are available in the next period as
a source of income to be used for consumption. However, the real value
in the next period of those nominal balances is deﬂated by the inﬂation rate
Pt+1/Pt, and the marginal utility is discounted back to the current period by
the factor β. Condition (14) states that these effects are mutually offsetting:
optimal behavior implies that a marginal change in real balances leaves utility
unchanged.





The interpretation of (15) is similar to that of (4). However, because here the
bonds pay off in dollars instead of goods, current real income is converted
into future real income at rate
Pt




βtλtmt = 0. (16)
Thishasasimilarinterpretationtothebondtransversalityconditionintheﬁrst
model.
The government budget constraint is
Mt/Pt + TR t = Mt−1/Pt; (17)
the left-hand side is the government’s sources of revenue, and the right-hand
sideisthegovernment’susesofrevenue. Becauseweassumethatanychanges
in the money supply are automatically accomplished by lump-sum transfers,
the government budget constraint does not play any role in the determination
of equilibrium.
Inequilibriumthegoodsmarketclears,implyingthatprivateconsumption
equals the total endowment of goods:
ct = y. (18)
Asbefore, constantconsumptionimpliesthatthemarginalutilityofconsump-
tion is constant, and in this case, from (15), the equilibrium nominal interest





see Fisher [(1930) 1954]). Combining (15), (3), and (19), we see that there
is a simple relationship between the nominal interest rate and the marginal
5 There is also a transversality condition for bonds. However, since the quantity of bonds is
zero, this condition is automatically satisﬁed.A. L. Wolman and E.A. Couper: Potential Consequences 7
utilities of consumption and real balances:







The marginal utility of consumption is known, so equation (20) then can be
used to express mt as a function of Rt; it is a money demand function. In
turn, equation (19) determines Rt as a function of expected inﬂation. Without
a speciﬁcation of monetary policy, however, we cannot determine the price
levelorexpectedinﬂation. Thestandardresearchpracticeistospecifyapolicy
rule for the quantity of money or the nominal interest rate. Given a rule that
sets one of these variables as a function of other variables, one can determine
whether equilibrium exists and is unique.
Note that if the rule makes the nominal interest rate depend only on Pt or
Pt+1, substituting the policy rule into (19) yields one forward-looking differ-
enceequationinthepricelevel. Henceforth,wewillassumethatthemonetary
policy rule sets the nominal interest rate as a function of the current inﬂation
rate, Rt = R(Pt/Pt−1). In this case, the difference equation describes inﬂa-
tion, which we will denote by π (that is, πt = Pt/Pt−1):
β−1πt+1 = R(πt). (21)
Below we will assume a particular form for R(), and thus we will be able to
determine whether there is a unique nonexplosive equilibrium.
The reader may be struck by the fact that the difference equation in (21)
is independent of the preference speciﬁcation in (12). It is a common feature
of simple monetary models that one can derive a difference equation in either
realbalancesorthepricelevel(inﬂationisatransformationofthepricelevel).
However, in general, one must bring in information from the “other” part
of the model in order to determine whether candidate paths are equilibria.
Anticipating the discussion below, here the linearization ignores information
from preferences, whereas the global analysis does not.
2. LINEARIZATION
The models we are working with contain just one dynamic variable and can
be written in the form
Etyt+1 = f(y t), (22)
where yt is the endogenous dynamic variable.
Linearization involves ﬁrst computing a steady state of this equation and
thentakingaﬁrstorderTaylor-seriesapproximationaroundthatsteadystate. A
steady state of the difference equation system is a point ¯ y such that ¯ y = f (¯ y),
and the linear approximation around this steady state is
(Etyt+1 −¯ y) = f  (¯ y)(yt −¯ y). (23)8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Dynamics of a Univariate Linear Difference Equation
1 2 3 4
1
0
This approximation is guaranteed to be valid only for small deviations from
the steady state. The univariate linear difference equation system (23) can be
written
Et ˜ yt+1 = A˜ yt, (24)




to exist; when yt is nonpredetermined, |A| must be greater than one.
The logic behind these conditions is easy to see when A is positive.6
Figure1plotstwopossiblecasesforthisunivariatelineardifferenceequation:
A>1 and 0 <A<1. The interpretation of these two cases depends on
whether the variable yt is predetermined.7
6 The case where A<0 is similar. There, −1 <A<0 produces dampened oscillations
rather than monotone convergence; A<−1 produces explosive oscillations. The number of
equilibria can then be determined in the same manner as in the case where A>0.
7 Using a plot of yt+1 versus yt (such as Figure 1), it is simple to trace the time path for
yt starting from an initial point y0. Start with y0 on the horizontal axis, and draw a vertical line
up to the function yt+1. Then draw a horizontal line to the 45-degree line and a vertical line
back to the horizontal axis. This is y1. Repeat to get y2, etc. If yt is a predetermined variable,
then the initial condition is known, and the process just described reveals the path of yt (if thereA. L. Wolman and E.A. Couper: Potential Consequences 9
First, suppose yt is not predetermined, so that the initial condition y0 is
not known but instead needs to be determined in equilibrium. Then if A>1,
any initial value y0 other than the steady state leads to yt exploding either
upward or downward: the steady state ¯ y is the unique nonexplosive solution.
If A<1, then yt will converge back to the steady state regardless of the
initial condition y0: at any point in time there is a continuum of nonexplosive
solutions, one of which is the steady state.
Now consider the case where yt is predetermined, so that at any point in
time yt is known and yt+1 can be read off the graph. Then if A>1, unless y0
happens to be equal to the steady state value, yt will explode over time: for
most initial conditions, a nonexplosive solution does not exist. If A<1, then
yt will converge back to the steady state regardless of the initial condition y0:
at any point in time there does exist a unique nonexplosive solution.
Formodelscontainingmorethanonevariable,therearerelatedconditions
involving the eigenvalues of a matrix A (see Blanchard and Kahn [1980]).
Sargent (1979, 177) describes the general principal as that of “solving stable
roots backward and unstable roots forward.”
Note that these conditions are concerned with the existence of nonex-
plosive solutions. It is common practice for researchers to restrict attention
to nonexplosive solutions. Sometimes equilibrium must be nonexplosive be-
cause of a transversality condition. In other cases, nonexplosiveness is not a
requirement of equilibrium, but researchers ﬁnd other equilibria unappealing
on a priori grounds. Our tax model falls into the former category: explosive
behavior (at a rate greater than β−1) cannot occur in equilibrium because of
thetransversalitycondition. Inourmonetarymodel, explosivebehaviorofthe
pricelevelcannotberuledoutasanequilibriumperse,butwewillnonetheless
restrict attention to nonexplosive equilibria.8
3. THREE PITFALLS OF EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON
LINEARIZATION
We have mentioned that linear approximations are less reliable far from the
steady state. This fact typically motivates researchers who use linearization
to study only examples in which there are small deviations around the steady
state. However, linearization may even give incorrect answers near the steady
state by suggesting an incorrect number of nonexplosive equilibria. This
possibility exists because a linear approximation treats the local properties of
the dynamic system as though they govern the model’s global behavior, and
is an equilibrium path). If yt is not predetermined, then the process reveals whether there is a
unique initial condition for which yt does not exhibit explosive behavior.
8As is clear from Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), in monetary models, ruling out candidate
equilibria based on simple explosiveness conditions is inappropriate. We use these conditions to
make our points more clearly.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Two Policy Rules for Lump-Sum Taxes
the global behavior can be crucial in determining the number of nonexplosive
equilibria. Locallythedynamicsmayimplythatavariableexplodesawayfrom
the steady state, whereas the global dynamics exhibit sufﬁcient nonlinearity
so that the explosiveness is shut off at some point. The opposite situation
can also occur. Using the models described earlier, we illustrate three ways
in which linear approximation can lead to an incorrect conclusion about the
number of nonexplosive equilibria in a model.
Spurious Nonexistence
It is possible that linearization suggests that there is no nonexplosive solution
when global analysis reveals that one in fact exists. In the tax model above,
the following tax policy gives such a result:




1 − β−1(g −¯ τ). (26)
ThispolicyruleisplottedinFigure2asthedashedline; itraisesthelump-sum
tax when the level of debt is above ¯ b and lowers the lump-sum-tax when the
levelofdebtisbelow ¯ b.Theresponsivenessoftaxestodebtisnonlinear,rising
in magnitude the further the stock of debt is from ¯ b. This behavior appearsA. L. Wolman and E.A. Couper: Potential Consequences 11
reasonable, in that it might be expected to bring the level of debt back toward
a steady state from any initial condition.
Combined with the government budget constraint (10), the tax rule yields
an equation describing the evolution of the stock of government debt:
bt+1 = g −¯ τ − τ1(bt − ¯ b)3 + β−1bt. (27)
Linearizing (27) around ¯ b, which is a steady state, we get
bt+1 − ¯ b = β−1  




τt =¯ τ.Given this nonresponsiveness, it is not surprising that an application
of the conditions discussed in Section 2 indicates that an equilibrium does not
exist unless the initial debt stock is equal to ¯ b. According to the linearized
model, for any initial debt level other than ¯ b, the quantity of debt will grow at
rate 1/β, violating the transversality condition.
The global analysis of (27) tells a very different story. A plot of bt+1
versus bt is given in Figure 3a.9 It turns out that there are three steady states:
¯ b1, ¯ b, and ¯ b2. If the initial debt happens to be equal to one of those steady
state values, there is a unique equilibrium with constant debt. If the initial
debt is not equal to one of the steady state values, but it lies in one of the
intervals (¯ b1, ¯ b) or (¯ b, ¯ b2), then there is a unique equilibrium in which the
debt converges to ¯ b1 or ¯ b2, respectively. The debt levels bl and bu correspond
to a unique equilibrium in which the debt cycles between those two levels. If
the initial debt is between bl and the steady state ¯ b1 (or between ¯ b2 and bu),
then there is a unique equilibrium in which the debt converges to one of the
steady states. Finally, if the initial debt is either below bl or above bu, then
there is no equilibrium, because the debt path implied by (27) violates the
transversality condition.
In this example, linearization leads us to conclude that an equilibrium
does not exist when in fact our analysis of the global dynamics shows that
there is an equilibrium for a wide range of initial conditions on the debt.
Since the nonexistence of equilibrium suggests that there is a fundamental
problem with a model, this possibility should lead to caution in interpreting
linearization when it results in a ﬁnding of nonexistence.
Spurious Existence
A second possibility is that there is a unique equilibrium to the linearized
model, but global analysis shows that there are no equilibria for a wide range
of initial conditions. Returning to the tax model, consider a tax policy given
9 In each panel of Figure 3, the dynamics of the linear approximation are indicated by a
dashed line.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 3 Three Nonlinear Difference EquationsA. L. Wolman and E.A. Couper: Potential Consequences 13
by
τt = h(bt) =− (bt − a)(bt − ¯ b)(bt − c) + bt. (29)
ThisfunctionisplottedasthesolidlineinFigure2,forcarefullychosenvalues
oftheparametersa, ¯ b,andc. Forthisrule,thetaxrateriseswiththedebtstock
nearthelevel ¯ bbutdecreaseswiththedebtstockfarawayfrom ¯ b. Substituting
(29) into the government budget constraint (10), the equation describing the
evolution of government debt is
bt+1 = g + (bt − a)(bt − ¯ b)(bt − c) − bt + β−1bt. (30)
Linearizing (30), we ﬁnd
bt+1 − ¯ b =
γ
      
((¯ b − a)(¯ b − c) − 1 + β−1)(bt − ¯ b), (31)
and we choose the parameters a, ¯ b, and c so that (¯ b − a)(¯ b − c) = 1 − β−1,
that is, γ = 0. For any starting value of bt, the linearized version implies that
government debt would converge immediately to the steady state ¯ b. This is
an example of the case where |A| < 1 and the one variable is predetermined.
Therefore, thereappearstobeauniquenonexplosivesolutiontothelinearized
equations and thus a unique equilibrium.
The nonlinear difference equation (30) is graphed in Figure 3b. If the
initial debt is between ¯ b1 and ¯ b2, then there is a unique equilibrium in which
the debt converges to ¯ b. However, if the initial debt is outside this range, no
equilibrium exists; the debt path implied by (30) violates the transversality
condition.
Here linearization leads us to conclude that there is a unique equilibrium,
whereasglobalanalysisrevealsthatexistencedependsontheinitialdebtstock.
One could argue that if the initial debt stock is within a reasonable range, then
there is a unique equilibrium and the linear dynamics give a good approx-
imation to that equilibrium. However, one could choose the parameters of
this example so that there is an arbitrarily small region in which the existence
results from the linear analysis hold.
Spurious Uniqueness
Finally, we can imagine a situation in which linearization suggests that there
is a unique nonexplosive equilibrium when in fact there are multiple nonex-
plosiveequilibria. Thisisthecasethathasbeenhighlightedintherecentwork
by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe.10 Turning to the monetary model,
10 The research of Christiano and Rostagno (2001) is a related work that also uses global
analysis.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly




+ γ (πt − 1), (32)
with γ>1/β. This rule represents a well-deﬁned, feasible policy for setting
thenominalinterestrate,aslongasthegrossinﬂationrateisclosetoitstargeted
steady state value of 1. Furthermore, this type of rule has been studied in both
empiricalandtheoreticalcontextsbyauthorssuchasClarida,Gali,andGertler
(2000). It is known as an active Taylor rule, because it is a Taylor-style rule
that raises the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with the current
inﬂation rate.
Combining the policy rule with the Fisher equation relating inﬂation to
the nominal interest rate, we arrive at the following equation describing the
evolution of inﬂation:
πt+1 = 1 + βγ (πt − 1). (33)
This difference equation has a unique steady state ¯ π = 1 (the targeted steady
state). Furthermore, the equation is already linear, so we need merely note
that the coefﬁcient on πt is greater than one to see that any path for inﬂation
other than the steady state will lead to inﬂation exploding upward (if π0 > 0)
or downward (if π0 < 0). Thus, there appears to be a unique nonexplosive
equilibrium.
The problem with the above reasoning is that along the explosive paths
on either side of the steady state, the policy rule (33) eventually implies an
infeasible choice of the nominal interest rate. First, consider an inﬂation path
in which the initial inﬂation rate is positive (π0 > 1). Along such a path,
the inﬂation rate becomes arbitrarily high, and the path is hence ruled out as
explosive. But if the inﬂation rate becomes arbitrarily high, at some point the
gross nominal interest rate exceeds R∗ ≡ u  (y)/
 
u  (y) − limm→0 v  (m)
 
.
At a gross nominal interest rate of R∗, the model economy demonetizes;
consumers will hold no money at interest rates equal to or greater than R∗,
because the marginal beneﬁt of real balances is bounded above by a number
lessthanthemarginalinterestcostofholdingrealbalances. Theeconomythus
does not have a well-deﬁned point-in-time equilibrium at a nominal interest
rate above R∗. Similarly, if the initial inﬂation rate is negative (π0 < 1),
the dynamics in (33) indicate that the inﬂation rate will eventually become
arbitrarily large with a negative sign. But then at some point the policy rule
(32) requires that the gross nominal interest rate be less than unity. At a gross
nominal interest rate equal to unity, consumers are satiated with real balances.
The nominal interest rate cannot fall below unity because all agents would
choose to hold negative quantities of nominal bonds (money would have a
negative opportunity cost), and bonds are in zero net supply.
Because the interest rate rule given by (32) implies infeasible policy ac-
tions in certain situations, that rule is not a complete description of policy. AA. L. Wolman and E.A. Couper: Potential Consequences 15
slightly modiﬁed rule that implies feasible policy actions in any situation is
Rt =

   
   

























<π t − 1.
The difference equation describing equilibrium then becomes
πt+1 =

   
   
























<π t − 1.
This nonlinear difference equation is illustrated in Figure 3c. The conse-
quences of modifying the policy rule so that it always delivers feasible policy
actions are dramatic. In the linear difference equation (33), paths beginning
from an initial inﬂation rate away from the steady state generated explosive
behavior of inﬂation (see the dashed line in Figure 3c). By contrast, the modi-
ﬁed policy rule implies that there are two steady states (π = β and ¯ π = βR∗)
in addition to the targeted steady state, and paths that begin away from the tar-
geted steady state converge to one of these new steady states. Thus, instead of
there being a unique nonexplosive equilibrium, there is a continuum, indexed
by the initial inﬂation rate.
4. DISCUSSION
We have shown how approximating economic models by linearization around
asteadystatemayleadtoincorrectconclusionsabouttheexistenceorunique-
nessofequilibrium. Ineachofourexamples,themisleadingresultsimpliedby
linearization were associated with a particular government policy rule. How-
ever, there is no reason to believe that it is only government policies that can
lead to these problems with linear approximations. One should not assume
that because a particular model has no role for government policy, a linear
approximation will necessarily give the right answers about the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium.
In the simple models studied here, it was easy to see—and hence avoid—
the problems associated with linearization. Unfortunately, with larger models
it is harder to see the red ﬂags signaling that linearization may be giving
incorrect answers. Furthermore, global analysis (i.e., analysis of the model
without any approximations) is infeasible with larger models.11 There are,
11 We should note that Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe (2001) conduct global analysis
of a two-variable system in continuous time. Kuznetsov (1998) discusses global analysis of a
two-variable system in discrete time.16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
however, steps one can take to minimize the risk of falling victim to the
problems described above. Before linearizing it is important to determine
the number of steady states. If there is more than one steady state, it may
not be advisable to work with a linear approximation unless one has a strong
reason for believing that only one of the steady states is relevant. If there is
a unique steady state, then in some models a check on the results of linear
approximationcanbeprovidedbyanalyzingasimpliﬁedversionofthemodel
in which it is feasible to compare the local linear and global dynamics. In the
case of a unique steady state, a promising approach currently receiving much
attention involves taking a local higher order approximation to the model’s
system of difference equations.12
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